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Abstract - The broadband plans deployed by governments have not 
benefited so far from substantive theoretical or empirical economic insights 
on the relative effectiveness of alternative combinations of policy 
interventions (on which more will be said in the next section). This paper 
make a first attempt at filling this gap by exploring whether some (set of) 
policy tools has so far proven to be more effective than others. We collected 
detailed data on the policies adopted by 21 OECD countries and perform a 
cross-country analysis. Our evidence suggests the relevance of the 
institutional environment form one side and the importance of demand-side 
interventions from the other. Interventions on the supply side appear to be 
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Broadband infrastructures are increasingly perceived as a key factor influencing the 
competitiveness and the growth potential of nations. While a precise definition is difficult to find 
due to the rapid evolution of technology and the existence of a range of alternative interpretations 
by different institutions, an acceptable way to define broadband is by reference to what broadband 
connectivity is not, namely a dial-up service for access to the Internet, and to what broadband is 
for sure, namely a way for consumers to enjoy high speed, two-way and always-on connectivity to 
the Internet. In other words, the availability of a broadband infrastructure implies the possibility 
to connect to the internet at a faster speed than conventional dial-up services. About how much 
faster such connection should be to qualify as broadband there is, however, no agreement. The 
International Telecommunications Union, for instance, defines as broadband Internet 
connectivity faster than that affordable with primary rate ISDN, i.e. 1,5 or 2 Mbps. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by contrast, in various official 
documents has made reference to the lower threshold of a download speed of 256 Kbps.  
Irrespective of the precise definition, broadband services may be delivered through various 
different technologies. The most widespread technology is, so far, the Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL) technology, which relies on the existing telecommunication copper network to provide 
connection speeds ranging from 256 Kbps to 52 Mbps, depending on the specific type of DSL 
(Asymmetric DSL (ADSL), High Rate DSL (HDSL), Symmetric DSL (SDSL) and Very High 
Data Rate DSL (VDSL)). The second most widespread technology is the Cable Modem, which 
provides faster connection speeds than the DSL (in the range of 1 to 10 Mbps), allowing for the 
simultaneous passage on the TV cable of triple-play services: voice, data and television.  Other 
relevant technologies for the provision of broadband services include Satellite,  Fixed Wireless 
Access (FWA), Power Line Communications (PLC, based on the electricity transmission network), 
Mobile Wireless and, most importantly in terms of quality and potential, Optic Fibre. Deployment 
of the latter allows the building of an Internet Protocol-based network that is normally referred 
to as Next Generation Network.  
The relevance of broadband for economic activity relates to the range of new and/or 
better applications that it enables as a platform. These include not only enhanced communication 
services and video streaming, but also new services in the domain of e-commerce, e-health, e-
government and e-education, just to mention the most prominent examples. In addition to this, 
broadband is widely believed to be a factor stimulating productivity growth, with positive 
consequences in terms of economic development, and to have positive effects in terms of social 
cohesion.    2
In view of the perceived salience, also within public opinion, of the issue of broadband 
deployment, most governments around the world have adopted policy interventions aimed at 
promoting investment. Almost all OECD countries have enacted more or less intense policy 
measures, often in the form of integrated plans requiring the coordination of action at various 
government levels, with some countries such as South Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, UK and, 
more recently, Australia, showing particularly high degrees of activism. This has occurred in 
spite of a lack of consensus on the very rationale for public involvement in broadband. Indeed, the 
debate on the appropriate role of governments with respect to broadband investment has been 
and still is intense. In spite of the relatively uncontroversial recognition of the benefits of the 
existence of an efficient broadband infrastructure, it is not clear whether they outweigh costs nor 
whether efficient investment would be forthcoming even in absence of public policy intervention.  
The answer to these questions is likely to depend on the choice of the relevant public 
policy objective. The three main objectives of broadband policy may be synthesized as follows: (1) 
extending the geographic coverage of broadband to areas currently not covered because of high 
costs of doing so (i.e. reducing or eliminating the so-called digital divide); (2) promoting 
broadband adoption by the largest possible number of citizens; and (3) improving the 
technological performance of existing networks by introducing ultra-broadband networks.  
In the past few years, different countries have not only chosen different combinations of 
the above objectives, but they have also adopted a particularly wide range of forms of intervention 
to stimulate investment in broadband deployment. At present, there is a significant variance in 
broadband uptake, as can be readily seen from inspection of figure 1, below, illustrating the 
number of broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the year 2008 for the selection of 21 
countries studied in this paper. 
 









































































































































































Source: Telecommunications Indicators Database (ITU, 2009) 
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The broadband plans deployed by governments have not benefited so far from substantive 
theoretical or empirical economic insights on the relative effectiveness of alternative 
combinations of policy interventions (on which more will be said in the next section). The aim of 
this paper is to make a first attempt at filling this gap by exploring whether some (set of) policy 
tools has so far proven to be more effective than others. In order to do so, we collect detailed data 
on the policies adopted by 21 OECD countries and perform a cross-country analysis.  
In a nutshell, two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. The first is that, in 
addition to policies purposefully devised to stimulate broadband investment, a particularly 
relevant role should be attributed to the wider institutional environment of the countries 
considered. The second is that, in choosing among the available policy tools, governments should 
accord preference to demand-side interventions. This is because government interventions on the 
supply side appear to be less effective on broadband diffusion than those on the demand side.  
The present exercise constitutes a first step in the direction of the definition of a strategy 
of selective policy intervention. Indeed, the choice of policy mix does not appear to have been 
particularly focused. Initiatives have been undertaken by multiple government levels sometimes 
in an uncoordinated fashion and often guided more by budget constraints than by conscious 
analysis.   
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 an overview of the main public policy tools 
for the promotion of broadband investment is provided. Section 3 briefly reviews the existing 
empirical literature that, although focusing more generally on the determinants of broadband 
penetration, is broadly related to the present paper. Section 4 illustrates the data used in this 




2. The set of broadband policy tools 
 
 
The range of policy instruments available to governments to stimulate broadband 
penetration includes at least three sets of tools. The first concerns directly the domain of 
telecommunications regulation and is made up of the various regulatory interventions that may 
contribute to create an investment-friendly regulatory environment. The second includes a varied 
ensemble of policy measures that may lower the cost of private investment, integrate it or 
substitute for it in scarcely attractive areas or help in the coordination of multiple investors. The 
third includes policy measures aimed at increasing the overall level of broadband demand either 
by stimulating business and/or consumer demand or by expressing additional demand of a public   4
nature. The first and the second set of policy tools can be categorized as “supply-side” policies, 
while the third set of policy tools as “demand-side” policies.  
Among the regulatory instruments that may have a bearing on telecommunications firms’ 
incentives to invest in broadband deployment, at least three sorts of measures have attracted 
considerable attention: (a) regulatory measures aimed at directly modifying the degree of vertical 
integration of the existing telecommunications network by introducing operational, functional or 
structural separation of the incumbent’s network; (b) the definition of access obligations to legacy 
networks and to the new networks through the adoption of so-called active and/or passive 
remedies; (c) the definition of access prices.  
The debate on these three forms of regulatory intervention, particularly intense in the 
past few years, has not led to agreed-upon solutions. The key issue in the regulation of broadband 
networks (and particularly of Next Generation Networks) concerns the balancing of two, possibly 
contrasting, objectives:  the stimulus to efficient private investment and the need to discipline 
monopolistic abuse by incumbents. 
With regard to the issue of vertical separation, even letting aside the obvious practical 
obstacles to a modification of the existing vertical structure of the legacy network, it has not been 
established with certainty whether vertical separation of the access network of incumbent firms 
from their retail activities has a positive impact in terms of incentives to invest in broadband. On 
one side, vertical separation is seen as an important tool to ensure effective competition and, 
through the latter, investment, in light of the fact that a vertically integrated incumbent is better 
able to adopt anticompetitive practices likely to harm competition (quality discrimination, price 
squeeze, cross-subsidies etc.). On the other side, vertical separation may undermine incumbents’ 
incentives to invest and/or may entail more or less relevant efficiency losses in terms of scale 
economies and increased costs of coordination.  
The imposition of access obligations both to existing and prospective networks also 
involves difficult trade-offs. By imposing the same access obligations of legacy networks to new 
networks, competition at the retail level is spurred, but at the cost of a possible reduction of 
incumbents’ incentives to invest. This trade-off figures prominently in the choice of the specific 
type of remedy suited to the broadband networks, and particularly in the choice between passive 
remedies (access to ducts, access to copper sub-loops, access to unbundled fibre) and active 
remedies (access to a range of bitstream products at regulated conditions). Equally relevant with 
respect to the mentioned trade-off is the issue of the definition of access prices that has recently 
been focused on the question of the design of forms of “risk sharing” and of a “risk premium”, 
endorsed by the European Commission. 
Other, less prominent, regulatory policy tools relevant for the purpose under 
consideration include the inclusion of broadband services within the domain of Universal Service   5
Obligations, a modification of the system through which prices are harmonized throughout 
various regions of the same country (in countries where it exists) that could help direct resources 
where needed and the possibility to define access obligations for non-telecommunications firms 
possessing physical networks whose use may help reduce the costs of new networks rollout. 
As for the supply-side interventions different from regulatory measures mentioned above, 
they could be defined as more akin to the category of “industrial policies”. They include a varied 
range of policy tools that express different levels of public involvement and have been adopted in 
various different combinations by OECD countries. Most countries have recently adopted some 
form of public financing of broadband infrastructures. Public funds may be provided through 
various means, and particularly through fiscal incentives programs,  long-term loans programs for 
broadband suppliers and subsidies. Korea and Japan have historically played a particularly active role 
in the provision of public financial support to private broadband players. They have more recently 
been joined by a large number of countries.  
Public funds may also be involved in the creation of Public-Private Partnerships 
(hereinafter, PPPs), although they do not constitute an essential element of these agreements. 
Recourse to PPPs is, indeed, often motivated by the public sector’s objective to attract private 
capital towards infrastructure financing, so as to complement or substitute for limited public 
resources. PPPs may take many different forms, associated to different degrees of involvement of 
public players. In some cases, often denominated Private Finance Initiatives or DBFO (Design-
Build-Finance-Operate), financial resources are predominantly of a private nature. In other cases, 
the presence of public capitals is more substantial. This is the case for PPPs in the form of DBO 
(Design-Build-Operate), BOT (Build-Operate and Transfer), BT (Build and Transfer), BRT (Build-
Rent and Transfer). In the latter cases the infrastructure is typically owned by the public sector 
and maintained and operated by the private sector on an open access basis.  
Relevant examples of the adoption of PPPs include the experience of CityNet in 
Amsterdam, a range of cases in France, where a specific legal framework has been set in place 
and, more recently, the cases of New Zealand and Australia, where the government has adopted 
plans to institute PPPs for the deployment of fibre networks of an FTTH type (Fibre-to-the-
Home), with a substantial input of public funds.  In particular, the Australian National Broadband 
Network envisages an investment of 23.6 billion euros in order to cover 90% of the population 
through an NGN that operates only at the wholesale level. In New Zealand, the government has 
proposed in the past few months to finance up to 50% of the costs of a new broadband access 
network that would cover 75% of the population.  
Another relevant form of supply-side intervention consists in the coordination of the sharing 
of networks and investments, which may be enacted through various specific policy measures. One   6
way in which coordination may be obtained is through initiatives aimed at coordinating the civil 
works necessary to the rollout of broadband connections, which make up a substantial portion of 
the total costs of broadband deployment (of course, this refers to the adoption of broadband 
technologies, such as optic fibre, which require the rollout of entirely new networks). Another 
form of coordination is implicit in the adoption of rules imposing the obligation to leave in the 
newly built ducts enough space to lay down multiple fibre optic cables. Finally, some programs 
promoting the cooperation among public administration and private parties different from PPPs 
can also be  interpreted as policies aimed at coordinating the sharing of networks and investments. 
Further supply-side policies that have been enacted by a relevant number of countries are: 
(a) territorial mapping programs, i.e. public initiatives aimed at supporting investment decisions by 
private operators by providing detailed information on the existing broadband coverage and 
eventually on the potential demand expressed in different geographic locations of the country; (b) 
promotion of specific technological standards, which refers to the more controversial decision adopted 
by some governments to support the adoption of specific technological solutions, especially for 
new buildings and for infrastructure initiatives adopted at the local level (e.g., by municipalities 
financing the deployment of local networks); (c) administrative simplification, namely initiatives 
aimed at reducing the bureaucratic costs involved by broadband investments; and (d) spectrum 
policy and rationalization of the use of frequencies, which may be enacted to pursue a number of 
different goals, including raising fresh funds to finance broadband investment and reducing 
barriers to entry to wireless firms wishing to provide broadband services, especially in rural or 
geographically disadvantaged areas where wired connection are more difficult to lay down. 
Demand-side policies may be more or less strictly targeted to stimulating broadband 
penetration, with some policies being more generally targeted at promoting ICT use by 
consumers and small businesses. Among the demand-side policy measures more clearly aimed at 
increasing incentives to invest in broadband can be included: (a) public demand of specific services, 
such as the provision of new or improved e-government, e-health or e-education applications, 
which increases the returns to investment in broadband particularly in circumstances in which 
private demand is still latent; (b) incentives for business demand such as, for instance, those 
envisaged by programs of enhancement of ICT penetration in SMEs; (c) incentives for private 
demand, among which IT alphabetization initiatives and vouchers may play a relevant role; (d) 
demand subsidies; and (e) demand aggregation policies, namely schemes aimed at coordinating the 
potential demand of consumers in order to ensure efficient resource allocation either through the 
registration of households’ willingness to subscribe to broadband services (as done in the UK) or 
through more elaborate forms of coordination (as adopted in Sweden). 
   7
 
3. Previous literature 
 
 
Broadband penetration has been the focus of a growing body of empirical research, as 
Internet accessibility has become one of the primary aspects of many business activities and 
services as well as an objective of social cohesion. The need for understanding both broadband 
demand and supply has so encouraged several empirical investigations aimed at explaining the 
variability of broadband deployment across areas within one country (Rappaport et al., 2003; 
Grubesic, 2003; Prieger, 2001) or region (Aizu, 2002) and across nations (Bauer et al., 2003; Cava-
Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
While some studies explicitly attempt to investigate the determinants of broadband 
demand (e.g., Madden and Simpson, 1997; Madden et al., 1999; Eisner and Waldon, 2001; 
Rappaport et al., 2003), others examine both supply and demand factors (e.g., Garcia-Murillo and 
Gabel, 2003; Bauer et al., 2003; Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
The former generally use micro-data, where the statistical unit is the household and the 
dependent variable is a binary choice (i.e. the use of a broadband/dial-up Internet connection). 
Trying to address the determinants of demand, this first body of research focuses on household 
characteristics (such as household size, income, age and education) while, on the supply side, only 
the price of broadband and dial-up service is included. For example, in the study by Rappaport et 
al.  (2003), multinomial logistic models are implemented on a sample of about 20000 US 
households and it is found that education and income level positively affect broadband use in 
individual households. Probabilistic models are also used to examine individual households’ 
decisions and broadband adoption by Madden and Simpson (1997) and Madden et al. (1999) for 
Australia, Takanori and Toshifumi (2006) for Japan, Cerno and Pérez-Amaral (2007) for Spain, 
and Cardona et al. (2009) for Austria. 
Those studies that include both supply and demand side factors present more 
comprehensive analyses, as they consider also supply factors and argue that the provision of 
broadband services is shaped by the demand characteristics to the extent to which demand 
stimulates telecommunication firms’ investments in specific areas. Thus, from this point of view, 
the research focus is the geographical digital divide and the reasons of spatial disparities rather 
than the choice of individual households; as Grubesic and Murray point out (2002), the 
geographical provision of broadband service is likely to be a function of profit seeking firms, so 
that only those locations with a potential for immediate return on investment will be selected for 
hardware upgrades. The link between population characteristics, infrastructure investments and 
broadband access is shown by several studies. Grubesic (2003) explores broadband access options 
in the state of Ohio (in the USA) and find that income, education, age, location and competition   8
from alternative broadband platforms influence digital subscribers line infrastructure investment 
leading to a urban/rural divide. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2003), implementing a supply-demand 
model on a sample of 30 OECD countries, show that the potential demand (along with cost 
conditions of deploying advanced networks) is one of the most influential factors explaining 
broadband uptake, although the relative income position appears not significant in their 
estimation.  
In a more recent paper, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) implement a supply-
demand model similar to that of Bauer et al. (2003) and provide more robust results. The two 
authors examine a sample of 30 OECD countries from 2000 to 2002 and explore the factors 
influencing broadband demand, supply and adoption. By performing multivariate regression 
analysis, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) find that technological competition and the 
low cost of deploying telecommunication infrastructures are likely to be the key drivers for 
broadband supply, while the predisposition to use new technologies is the crucial determinant of 
broadband demand. In particular, they show a positive correlation between broadband 
penetration, on the one hand, and income, household density, population density, urban 
population, education and competition between technologies, on the other; differently, market 
competition (measured by the percentage of telephone lines of new entrants) does not seem to 
have a significant influence on the availability of broadband infrastructures for DSL or for cable 
technology. Nevertheless, notice that other studies (see, e.g., Garcia-Murillo and Gabel, 2003) 
report a positive and statistically significant effect of market competition on the percentage of 
broadband users in a given country. Finally, that the private and business demand drives 
broadband investments and diffusion is also found by Prieger (2001) on US data, which extends 
his analysis to some proxies for the composition of the business market (considering the 
percentage of manufacturing and services firms and firms’ dimension) that, however, do not show 
statistically significant effects.  
Impact of regulatory choices in the telecommunications sector on broadband penetration 
(Manenti ecc.) 
Despite the rich array of results provided by the empirical studies above mentioned, which 
may help defining policy strategies, a systematic analysis of the role played by policy 
interventions is still missing. This may be due to two facts. On the one hand, the limited 
availability of data, that strongly constraints empirical models on this issue (especially when one 
tries to introduce policy variables) and forces researchers to caution in interpreting estimation 
results. On the other hand, the few available results are not encouraging. Bauer et al. (2003), for 
example, add to their econometric model some dummies reflecting policy regimes (that include 
unbundling, the separation of cable and telephone company ownership, and the availability of   9
government funding to support broadband deployment), which, however, do not produce 
statistically significant parameter estimates. Similarly, a comparative study of broadband diffusion 
in Asia by Aizu (2002) reports that government policies do not have much influence in promoting 
broadband use. Nevertheless, tax incentives to encourage firms to serve underserved markets are 
suggested by some authors (see Gabel and Kwan, 2002) along with medium-intervention 
strategies involving both supply-side actions to assist in the establishment of broadband 
networks and demand-side actions to promote broadband service adoption (Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
We collect data from various sources in order to develop a well-suited dataset for 
econometric analysis purposes. The final dataset covers 21 OECD countries and collects a rich 
array of country-specific information about telecommunications, socio-economic conditions, 
demographic characteristics and institutional features. Data refer to 2006 and 2007 for the most 
part, while we were forced to use also data for the 2002-2005 period for some variables. 
Broadband penetration. We measure broadband penetration by using the number of 
broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants (BBSUBi). Such a measure is provided by the World 
Telecommunications Indicators Database (ITU, 2009). 
Industrial policies and demand policies. As our main focus, we are interested in 
investigating the effect, if any, of telecommunications-specific industrial and demand policies on 
broadband penetration in OECD countries. Thus, we need to develop appropriate indicators for 
these two groups of policies at the country level. In order to pursue this goal, we consider various 
policies or government initiatives. On the supply side, we include:  
• the presence of PPPs;  
• the coordination of the sharing of networks and investments; 
• territorial mapping programs; 
• fiscal incentives programs; 
• long-term loans programs for broadband suppliers;  
• the promotion of specific technological standards;  
• spectrum policy and rationalization of the use of frequencies; 
• administrative simplification; 
On the demand side, we consider:  
• public demand of services;  
• demand aggregation policies; 
• incentives to business demand;    10
• incentives to private demand; 
• demand subsidies.  
Unfortunately, we cannot consider all of these components separately in the empirical 
analysis, since the small number of observations does not allows us to use a large number of 
variables in the operative model (what would cause the well known problem of the loss of degrees 
of freedom and prevent us from implementing statistical inference on the data). Thus, we 
construct two synthetic indicators according to the following strategy. As a first step, we 
aggregate the policies’ components for both supply and demand side for each country, by adding 
1 when each component (i.e. policy or government initiative) is in place in the individual country. 
Doing so, we obtain two raw indexes that range from 1 to 8 (in the case of industrial policies) and 
from 1 to 5 (in the case of demand policies). Notice that this is a standard procedure for coding 
qualitative institutional variables and that it is routinely used in empirical analysis (see, for 
example, La Porta et al., 1998). In this way, however, we are not sure to validly compare 
countries, given that countries with the same value in one of the two (or both) indexes may adopt 
substantially different policies. Therefore, as a second step, we group countries on the base of the 
number of different policies which they adopt and cluster them in three classes for both industrial 
and demand policies in order to reduce the risk of wrong coding. In accordance with their 
qualitative nature, the two final variables for both supply and demand side policies (respectively, 
INDPOLi and DEMPOLi) take a value of 3 in the case of widespread policies, of 2 in the case of 
limited policies, and 1 when policies are absent or very limited. In this way, we also minimize 
heteroskedasticity and problems with influential outliers. 
Several further variables are included in our analysis as controls.  
Venture capital availability. Venture capital may be an important determinant of 
broadband penetration, by affecting capital availability of new ICT firms and potential 
competitors. We consider two indicators as a measure of venture capital: venture capital 
investments in communication as a percentage of all venture capital investment in a given 
country (source: OECD Information Technology Outlook, OECD, 2008) and the venture capital 
investments in communication in a given country, as a percentage of all venture capital 
investment, weighted by the ease for finding venture capital in the same country (source of the 
first component: OECD Information Technology Outlook (OECD, 2008); source of the second 
component: Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum, 2009). The two variables 
are called, respectively, VCCi and VCEi. 
Effectiveness of antimonopoly policy. Also the effectiveness of the antimonopoly policy 
of a given country may be an important influence on the broadband penetration in the same 
country, by shaping firms’ behavior and, in turn, investment decisions. We measure such a   11
dimension using the index provided by the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic 
Forum, 2009) and coding it as a dummy variable that equals 0 if the antimonopoly policy is lax 
and not effecting at promoting competition and 1 if the antimonopoly policy is effective and 
promotes competition (the final variable is called ANTIMONi). 
Quality of laws about ICT use. How the law regulates the use of information technology 
instruments and protect consumers is of major importance on the demand of Internet hosts and 
broadband. Thus, we include an index for the degree of sophistication of laws relating the use of 
information technology (such as electronic commerce, digital signatures and consumer 
protection). The index (LAWICTi) ranges from 1, when these laws are non existent, to 7, when 
they are well developed and enforced (source: World Economic Forum, 2009). 
Number of websites. The demand of fast Internet connections may be also affected by the 
contents available (as suggested by Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006). In this case, we 
use data from the OECD Communication Outlook (OECD, 2003) and include a variable that 
measures the number of websites per 1000 inhabitants (WEBSITESi).  
Technological competition. The potential influence of technological competition on 
broadband penetration has been suggested by some contributions (e.g., Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz, 2006). In our empirical analysis, technological competition is represented by the 
following three variables: mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (MOBSUBi), mobile 
cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) as a percentage of total telephone subscribers 
(MOBTELSUBi), number of dial-up Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants (DIALUPi). The 
source of the variable is the World Telecommunications Indicators Database (ITU, 2009) for 
MOBSUBi and MOBTELSUBi, and OECD Statistical Database (OECD, 2009) for DIALUPi. 
Availability of Internet hosts. The number of Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants 
(HOSTSi) measures the potential demand of broadband connections (source: OECD Statistical 
Database (OECD, 2009)). 
Population characteristics. In the empirical analysis we use several demographic 
indicators that capture some population characteristics potentially relevant in shaping broadband 
demand: urban population as a percentage of total population (URBANi; source: Demographic 
Yearbook (UN, 2007)), population density per Km2 (POPDENSi; source: World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2009)), female as a percentage of total population (FEMALEi; source: 
Demographic Yearbook (UN, 2007)), percentage of population under 15 years (UNDER15i; 
source: Demographic Yearbook (UN, 2007)), percentage of population over 60 years (OVER60i; 
source: Demographic Yearbook (UN, 2007)), graduates as a percentage of total population 
(GRADUATESi; source: OECD Statistical Database (OECD, 2009)). The potentially relevant role 
played by the population age structure is pointed out by Gabel and Kwan (2000), Rappaport et al.   12
(2000) and Prieger (2001), that of the education level by Gabel and Kwan (2000), Rappaport et al. 
(2000), Prieger  (2001), Grubesic (2003) and Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006), that of 
sex by Rappaport and Taylor (2000) and Prieger  (2001), that of the percentage of urban 
population by Prieger  (2001) and Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006), that of population 
density, finally, by Prieger (2001), Garcia-Murillo and Gabel (2003), Bauer, Kim and Wildman 
(2003) and Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006). 
Other demand characteristics. We also include the logarithm of the GNI per capita 
(GNIi) (as suggested by Gabel and Kwan, 2000, Rappaport et al., 2000, Prieger, 2001, Garcia-
Murillo and Gabel, 2003, Grubesic, 2003, Bauer, Kim and Wildman, 2003, Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz, 2006), and the value added of services as a percentage of GDP (SERVICESi) (as 
suggested by Prieger, 2001). For both variables the source is World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2009). Doing so, we try to measure individuals’ capability to afford the price of 
Internet connections and the type of business demand (services presumably do require Internet 
connections more than industrial or agricultural activities). 
Quality of electricity supply. Finally we use an indicator in order to measure the quality 
of the infrastructures needed for broadband Internet connections, specifically we use an index 
(ELECTRICITYi) that range from 1, when the quality of the electricity supply (i.e. lack of 
interruptions and lack of voltage fluctuations) is worse than in other countries, to 7, when it 

















Table 1 reports a descriptive analysis of the dataset. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (cross-country data). 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  NAME OF THE 
VARIABLE  OBS M EAN S TD.DEV. MIN M AX 
Broadband subscribers (per 100 inh.)   BBSUBi  21 20.34 7.91 3.85 31.95 
Demand policies   DEMPOLi  21 2.19 0.60 1.00 3.00 
Industrial policies   INDPOLi  21 2.33 0.79 1.00 3.00 
Venture capital availability   VCCi  21 10.22 9.06 0.00 29.30 
Venture capital availability (weighted)   VCEi  21 2.45 2.01 0.00 6.23 
Anti-monopolicy policy   ANTIMONi  21 0.76 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Urban population   URBANi  21  77.52 10.44 54.90  98.6 
GNI (logarithm)   GNIi  21 10.33 0.29 9.38 10.85 
Graduates (per 100 inh.)   GRADUATESi  21 1.16 0.26 0.62 1.65 
Mobile subscriptions (per 100 inh.)   MOBSUBi  21  97.48 17.21 57.46  136.34 
Mobile subscriptions  
(per 100 inh., % total telephone sub.)   MOBTELSUBi  21 66.30 6.01 50.70  79.40 
Dial-up Internet subscribers (per 100 inh.)   DIALUPi  21 8.47 5.94 0.09  20.40 
Internet hosts (per 100 inh.)   HOSTSi  21 17.10  14.19 0.44 48.88 
Websites (per 100 inh.)   WEBSITESi  15 36.14  27.47 2.90 84.70 
Population density (per Km2)   POPDENSi  21 141.03  146.28 2.67 486.57 
Services (% of GDP)   SERVICESi  21 69.14 6.02 53.47  77.28 
Female (% of population)   FEMALEi  21 50.55 0.72 49.11  51.59 
Quality of electricity supplì 
 
ELECTRICITYi 
21 6.21 0.75 4.20 6.90 
Population under 15 years (%)   UNDER15i  21 17.45 3.07 13.32  26.81 
Population over 60 years (%)   OVER15i  21 21.30 4.49 8.82 29.67 
Laws relating ICT   LAWICTi  21 5.22 0.64 3.60 6.10 
                    
 
 
5. Econometric analysis 
5.1 Correlation analysis 
 
We consider broadband penetration as a function of industrial and demand policies and of the 
control variables above described; formally, we consider the following relation (variables’ 
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Given the small number of observations, we cannot consider all the covariates in the same 
regression model (what would cause, as mentioned above, the impossibility of performing 
statistical inference on the data). Therefore, we divide our statistical analysis in two steps. First, 
we undertake a correlation analysis in order to identify those control variables that are correlated   14
with broadband penetration in a statistical significant way. Second, once the subset of potentially 
relevant variables is selected, we perform an econometric analysis on various model specifications. 
In this section, we present the results of the correlation analysis.  
In the correlation analysis, we calculate the correlation coefficients of BBSUBi and each 
covariate included in the second part of equation (1); then, we calculate the p-value for each 
correlation coefficient and identify those relations that are statistically relevant on the base of a 
conventional level of significance.  
Table 2 reports the statistical results of this analysis; while the first and the second 
columns report variables’ definition and name, the third and the fourth columns report, 
respectively, the value of the pairwise correlation coefficients and the p-values, the fifth column 
identifies those relations that can be considered statistically significant. Interesting relations are 
so unveiled.  
 









P-VALUE  STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Anti-monopolicy policy   ANTIMONi  0.72 0.002  *** 
Laws relating ICT   LAWICTi  0.78 0.000  *** 
Venture capital availability   VCCi  0.57 0.006  *** 
Venture capital availability (weighted)   VCEi  0.43 0.050  ** 
Quality of electricity supplì   
ELECTRICITYi  0.85 0.000  *** 
Internet hosts (per 100 inh.)   HOSTSi  0.63 0.002  *** 
GNI (logarithm)   GNIi  0.63 0.002  *** 
Graduates (per 100 inh.)   GRADUATESi  0.38 0.083  * 
Urban population   URBANi  0.33 0.142   
Mobile subscriptions (per 100 inh.)   MOBSUBi  0.04 0.851   
Mobile subscriptions  
(per 100 inh., % total telephone sub.)   MOBTELSUBi  -0.23 0.307   
Dial-up subscribers (per 100 inh.)   DIALUPi  -0.04 0.835   
Websites (per 100 inh.)   WEBSITESi  0.34 0.204   
Population density (per Km2)   POPDENSi  0.25 0.264   
Services (% of GDP)   SERVICESi  -0.07 0.756   
Female (% population)   FEMALEi  -0.15 0.497   
Population under 15 years (%)   UNDER15i  -0.09 0.671   
Population over 60 years (%)   OVER15i  0.11 0.615   
           
Note: level of confidence of statistical significance (“*” = 90%, “**” = 95%, “***” = 99%). 
 
 
First, the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policies (ANTIMONi) is shown to be statistically 
related with the broadband penetration as well as the quality of laws relating the use of 
information technology (LAWICTi). Such a finding shows that the national institutional 
environment may be of major importance for the diffusion of broadband Internet connections, by   15
affecting both firms’ behavior (by means of antimonopoly policies) and broadband demand (by 
means of the consumer protection and the regulation of electronic commerce).  
Second, the availability of venture capital is correlated with the broadband penetration in a 
statistically significant way, when it is measured by means of both the amount of venture capital 
investments in communication, expressed as a percentage of all venture capital investment (VCCi), 
and the amount of the venture capital investments in communication (as a percentage of all 
venture capital investment) weighted by the ease for finding venture capital in the given country 
(VCEi). 
Third, the quality of the electricity supply (ELECTRICITYi) has a statistically significant 
correlation with the broadband penetration. Thus, also the quality of the infrastructures (such as 
the electricity supply) results as a potentially relevant variable in our analysis. 
Fourth, broadband penetration may be also affected by the volume of the potential 
demand, that we measure by using the number of Internet hosts (HOSTSi) and a proxy for the 
per capita income (GNIi). 
Finally, the demographic characteristics of the population (with the exception of 
GRADUATESi) and technological competition seem to be statistically non relevant, what 
apparently contrasts empirical findings of other studies (see, for example, Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
5.2.1 Ordinary least-square regressions. 
 
The correlation analysis allows us to define a subset of control variables potentially 
relevant in explaining the cross-country variability of broadband penetration. In this section, we 
develop a multivariate regression analysis in order to further explore the statistical relations 
above mentioned. 
We consider the following regression model: 
i i i i i i ANTIMON VCE VCC INDPOL DEMPOL BBSUB 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β + + + + + =                                                        (2) 
i i i i i i GRADUATES GNI Y ELECTRICIT LAWICT HOSTS ε β β β β β + + + + + + 10 9 8 7 6  
 
where symbols’ meaning and variables’ descriptions are given in the previous section. The 
vector β = [β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10] defines the parametric structure (in particular β0 is 
the model constant), while εi is the error term. Given the small number of observations, we start   16
considering an abridged version of the model and progressively add the controls, so testing the 
estimation robustness. 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the estimation results of, respectively, abridged and extended 
model specifications. In both tables, while the first column reports the variables, the remaining 
columns report the estimated parameters of the various model specifications.   17
Table 3. Cross-country estimation results: abridged model versions. 
VARIABLE   M ODEL (a)   MODEL (b)    MODEL (c)    MODEL (d)  MODEL (e) 
 
Dep.Var.: BBSUBi 
    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
DEMPOLi   
 
4.681 

















INDPOLi    4.101 
  (2.191) *    2.732 
(2.122)    -1.058 
(1.822)    -1.564 
(1.862)    -0.298 
 (2.034) 
VCCi   --    0.408 
  (0.195) *    0.332 
    (0.144) **    --   0.489 
     (0.164) *** 
VCEi   --    --    --    1.481 
    (0.629) **   -- 
ANTIMONi   --    --    13.067 
       (3.240) ***    14.259 
      (3.193) ***   -- 
GRADUATESi   --    --    --    --   11.413 
      (3.805) *** 
                  
Statistical details                   
                  
No. Obs.    21    21    21    21  21 
Prob. > F    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000  0.000 
R-square   0.881   0.905    0.951    0.952  0.937 
                   




Table 4. Cross-country estimation results: extended model versions. 
VARIABLE    MODEL (f)    MODEL (g)    MODEL (h)    MODEL (i) 
 
Dep.Var.: BBSUBi 
    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
DEMPOLi   
 
2.772 












  (1.654) 
INDPOLi    0.093 
 (1.638)    -1.062 
(1.609)    -1.412 
(1.365)    0.062 
(1.493) 
VCCi    0.316 
    (0.125) **    0.346 
     (0.116) ***    0.344 
      (0.098) ***    0.350 
      (0.117) *** 
ANTIMONi    8.715 
    (3.268) **    8.495 
   (2.999) **    6.374 
     (2.664) **    -- 
LAWICTi    --    --    --    2.708 
     (0.850) *** 
HOSTSi    0.220 
     (0.085) **    0.192 
    (0.079) **    0.164 
    (0.068) **    0.255 
     (0.073) *** 
GNIi    --    0.837 
   (0.417) *    --    -- 
ELECTRICITYi    --    --    2.120 
       (0.642) ***    -- 
                 
Statistical details                 
                 
No. Obs.    21    21    21    21 
Prob. > F    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
R-square    0.965    0.972    0.980    0.969 
                 




The parameter estimates show that demand policies may be an important influence on 
broadband penetration. Indeed, model specifications (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g), reported   18
respectively from the second to the fifth column of Table 3 and in the second and third column of 
Table 4, show that the demand policies (as measured by our synthetic index) have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on broadband penetration in OECD countries. On the contrary, 
industrial policies turn out as statistically significant only in model specification (a), so that 
government interventions on the supply side appear to be less effective on broadband diffusion 
than those on the demand side.  
The parameter estimates referring to the control variables are broadly stable across the 
various model specifications and confirm all the relations unveiled by the correlation analysis. In 
particular, the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policies (ANTIMONi), the sophistication of laws 
relating the use of information technology (LAWICTi), the availability of venture capital (as 
measured by both the variables VCCi and VCEi), the quality of the electricity supply 
(ELECTRICITYi), the number of Internet hosts (HOSTSi), the per capita income (GNIi) and the 
percentage of graduates (GRADUATESi) all have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
broadband penetration. Notice that the variables’ couples LAWICTi-ANTIMONi, GNIi-
ELECTRICITYi,  VCCi-VCEi,  GRADUATESi-HOSTSi  and  GRADUATESi-ANTIMONi show a 
statistically significant pairwise correlation coefficient; thus, individual variables (within couples) 
are included one by one in the operative model in order to avoid multi-collinearity problems. 
The diagnostic analysis (performed by using the F-statistics), notwithstanding the small 
number of observations, leads us to reject the null hypothesis of joint non statistical significance 
of all the parameters. Statistical details of the abridged model specifications are reported in Table 
3, while those of the extended model specifications are collected in Table 4. 
 
5.2.2 Three-stage least-square regressions. 
 
Endogeneity. 
The ordinary least-square estimation, presented in the previous section, has showed that 
the demand policies may play an important role in explaining the cross-country variability of 
broadband penetration. Nevertheless, countries do not have all the same capabilities to undertake 
stimulating policies on the demand side, which are presumably costly for the government. So, in 
this section, we consider the indicator of demand policies as an endogenous variable in order to 
make our econometric model more complete and to increase, in turn, the overall statistical 
robustness of the estimation results. 
For this purpose, we consider the demand policies that a given country adopt as a function 
of the central government gross surplus/deficit spending (as a percentage of GDP) and the 
government gross debt (as a percentage of GDP). Both these measures are provided by the World   19
Economic Outlook Database (IMF, 2008) and refer to 2007. In our operative model, they are 
called, respectively, SURPLUSi and DEBTi.  
 
Econometric specification. 
Formally, we consider the following cross-country two-equation model: 
i i i i i i i i i GNI HOSTS ANTIMON VCE VCC INDPOL DEMPOL BBSUB υ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0              (3) 
i i i i DEBT SURPLUS DEMPOL τ λ λ λ + + + = 2 1 0                                                                                                              (4) 
where the vectors δ = [δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5, δ6, δ7] and λ = [λ0, λ1, λ2] define the parametric 
structure (in particular δ0 and λ0 are the two model constants), while υi and τi are the error terms. 
Notice that, in our operative model, it is possible to deduce the structural parameters from the 
known reduced form parameters. There is no more than one structure that can lead to the same 
reduced form, therefore we can estimate the structure.  
As equations (3) and (4) show, we allow broadband penetration to react to demand policies 
and, simultaneously, demand policies to react to SURPLUSi and DEBTi. Consequently, υi is likely 
to be correlated with DEMPOLi. Thus, we jointly estimate the two equations using a three-stage 
least square procedure (3SLS hereafter). Let us call X = [X1, X2] the matrix of regressors, where 
X1 is a matrix composed of variables assumed exogenous with respect to the broadband 
penetration, while X2 is made of m variables that are suspected to be endogenous in the model 
(the demand policies index in this case). Select a number k ≥ m of instrumental variables Z that 
satisfy the two fundamental requirements that Cov(Z, X2) ≠ 0 (relevance) and Cov(Z, ζ) = 0 
(exogeneity). Then a system 2SLS is implemented, where, in the first stage, X2 is regressed over Z 
and a constant. The parameter estimates so generated are then saved and used to form a 
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbances ζ that allows for correlation of 
the residuals across the equations of the system. The covariance matrix is finally adopted as a 
weighting matrix to re-estimate the system and get the new values of the parameters in the last 
step. The last two steps are iterated over the estimated disturbance covariance and parameter 
estimates until the parameter estimates converge. 
When the instruments do not have a statistically significant role in explaining the cross-
country variation of demand policies, they are called “weak”. In the presence of weak instruments, 
the estimated coefficients from the identification test turn out non-standard and tests are 
misleading (Staiger and Stock, 1997). As we have mentioned above, an instrumental variable must 
satisfy two requirements: it must be correlated with the included endogenous variable (relevance) 
and orthogonal to the error process (exogeneity). On the one hand, the former condition may be   20
readily tested by examining the fit of the first stage regression. The first stage regression is a 
reduced form regression of the endogenous variable DEMPOLi on the full set of instruments Z; 
the relevant test statistics here relate to the explanatory power of the excluded instruments Z1 in 
this regression.1 On the other hand, to verify the exogeneity of the instruments, it is commonly 
implemented the Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions; in particular, the hypothesis 
being tested with the Sargan test is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to some set 
of residuals, and therefore they are acceptable instruments. The results of the diagnostic analysis 
of our estimation are commented at the end of the following sub-section. 
 
Results and diagnostics. 
Table 5 reports the estimation results. While the first column reports the variables, the 
remaining columns report the estimated parameters of the various model specifications. The two-
equation parameters, simultaneously estimated, are reported in succession. 
Table 5. Cross-country estimation results: three-stage least-square estimation. 
VARIABLE   M ODEL (m)    MODEL (n)    MODEL (o) 
 
Eq. 1. Dep.Var.: BBSUBi 
    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
DEMPOLi   
 
6.125 








         (2.804) *** 
INDPOLi    -2.258 
 (1.991)    -1.827 
(1.531)    -2.422 
(1.761) 
VCCi    0.359 
      (0.111) ***    0.359 
     (0.104) ***    -- 
VCEi   --   --    1.453 
      (0.506) *** 
ANTIMONi    9.565 
      (2.962) ***    9.228 
    (2.723) **    10.954 
       (3.052) *** 
HOSTSi    0.151 
     (0.083) *    0.166 
    (0.072) **    0.155 
   (0.081) * 
GNIi   --   0.243 
       (0.480)     -0.128 
(0.528) 
            
 
Eq. 2. Dep.Var.: DEMPOLi 
    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
SURPLUSi   
 
0.115 








         (0.054) ** 
DEBTi    0.022 
      (0.003) ***    0.023 
      (0.003) ***    0.023 
      (0.003) *** 
            
Statistical details             
            
No. Obs.    21    21    21 
Wald test (eq. 1): p-value   0.000   0.000    0.000 
R-square (eq. 1)   0.949   0.962    0.950 
Wald test (eq. 2): p-value    0.000    0.000    0.000 
R-square (eq. 2)    0.688    0.691    0.690 
Sargan test [p-value]    3.208 [>10%]    2.025 [>10%]    1.741 [>10%] 
            
Note: level of confidence of statistical significance (“*” = 90%, “**” = 95%, “***” = 99%). 
                                                        
1 More precisely, the first stage R-square is the “squared partial correlation” between the excluded instruments Z1 and 
the endogenous regressor in question. It is defined as (RSSZ1 - RSSZ)/TSS, where RSSZ2 is the residual sum of squares in 
the regression of the endogenous regressor on Z2 – the included instruments –, and RSSZ is the RSS when the full set of 
instruments is used.   21
 
Addressing endogeneity problems, the robustness of the estimation results is increased, as 
the R-square of the equation (3) shows very high values and the index of demand policies turns 
out as statistically significant in all the model specifications (m), (n) and (o) considered, reported 
from the second to the fourth column of Table 5. 
Further interesting results are obtained. Specifically, demand policies are shown to be 
endogenous with respect to the central government gross surplus/deficit spending, so that the 
higher the surplus/deficit ratio, the wider the extension of the public policies on the demand side. 
Moreover, countries with a high level of government gross debt seem to be more likely to 
undertake demand policies, what suggests, in this case, that the causal relation may also goes 
from public policies to public debt. 
We have performed a diagnostic analysis of both the estimation strategy and results. First, 
we have checked relevance and exogeneity of the instruments used in the estimation. In order to 
test the relevance condition, as recommended by Bound et al. (1995), we have examined the first 
stage  R-square, which, in our model specifications, turns out greater than 0.3, that is the 
commonly used acceptance threshold (Shea, 1997). In order to test the exogeneity condition, we 
have implemented the Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. The test results lead us to 
not reject the null hypothesis (at the conventional level of significance, 10%), thus the 
instruments pass the test and they are statistically validated. Second, as an overall diagnostic 
procedure, we have performed the Wald test on all the model specifications; the test results, 
notwithstanding the small number of observations, lead us to reject the null hypothesis of joint 
non statistical significance of all the parameters. Statistical details of the 3SLS estimation are 




The objective of this paper has been to fill a small but relevant gap in the empirical literature on 
broadband deployment by providing an analysis of the relative effectiveness of a range of supply-
side and demand-side policy interventions aimed at stimulating broadband investment. The lack of 
empirical analyses specifically focused on the policy side of the broadband debate may be 
motivated by a number of reasons that include the difficulty of gathering adequate information for 
a number of countries sufficient to make the analysis meaningful in a policy context that is 
permanently in flux. One of the strengths of this paper is that it relies on a dataset assembled in 
part on the basis of such time-consuming process of information-gathering. Indeed, the data on 
the policies adopted in the 21 OECD countries considered in the study have been carefully 
retrieved on the basis of an extensive analysis of the existing academic literature, of consulting   22
firms’ reports, official documents and governments’ and newspapers’ websites.  This strength 
turns out to some extent to be a weakness of the paper, however, to the extent that it has limited 
the number of countries that could be taken into account in the analysis so far.  
The relevance of the analysis performed in the paper is not only academic. The ubiquitous 
broadband investment plans adopted by governments worldwide have not been able to rely on 
much substantive guidance from the economic profession in their choice of policy tools. At a time 
in which the financial crisis makes governments’ budget constraints ever more binding (even if it 
also provides in some countries renewed impetus for the adoption of infrastructure-centred 
Keynesian policies), this lack of information on which to ground selective interventions is 
particularly unfortunate.  
The present paper makes a first, albeit small, step in the direction of providing some 
information that may constitute the basis for selective broadband policy interventions.  From a 
practical point of view, the conclusion that may be most useful to policy-makers in the short term 
is that demand-side policies show, on the aggregate, greater effectiveness than supply-side 
interventions. Indeed, the results of our analysis show that demand policies (as measured by our 
synthetic index) have a positive and statistically significant effect on broadband penetration in the 
21 OECD countries considered, while industrial policies turn out as statistically significant only 
in one out of 10 model specifications. This is to some extent surprising, in light of the fact that 
most of the attention has been historically placed on supply-side interventions, with demand-side 
interventions being considered a useful, though not essential, component of a broadband policy 
plans.  
Other relevant results concern our control variables. On the positive side, we are able to 
single out a number of “institutional” variables, i.e. a number of variables capturing the 
characteristics of different countries institutional environment, that appear to play a role in 
broadband penetration. This is the case for the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policies, the quality 
of laws relating the use of information technology and the availability of venture capital, all 
shown to be statistically related with broadband penetration. The quality of other sorts of 
infrastructures, and particularly electricity supply, has also a statistically significant correlation 
with the broadband penetration.  
On the negative side, we obtain some results that question the results of previous studies. 
More specifically, we find that the demographic characteristics of the population (with the 
exception of the variable capturing the proportion of graduates in the population) and 
technological competition seem to be statistically non relevant, in apparent contrast with other 
studies (see, for example, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
Further work is surely needed to improve the strength of the present analysis. In 
particular, the dependent variable should be more carefully characterized by taking into account   23
not only DSL penetration, as it has been done in this study, but also the data on alternative 
broadband technologies. The number of countries considered should also be extended. In spite of 
these limitations, however, we believe that our research work may be of some use to both 
researchers and policy-makers. 
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